Abstract
The problem of multiple criteria optimization 22 has been studied for many years, and the tech-23 niques of multiple criteria analysis have found 24 success in many diverse applications [23, 24] . The 25 standard approach starts with an assumption that 26 the criteria are incomparable, i.e. having no basis 27 of comparison. However, there are many applica-28 tions in which the criteria are uniform in the sense 29 of the scale used and their values are directly 30 comparable. Moreover, the criteria are considered 31 impartially which makes the distribution of out-32 comes more important than the assignment of 33 several outcomes to the specific criteria. Such 34 models express ideas of allocation of resources and 35 try to achieve some equitable allocation of re-36 sources [10] . More generally, the models are related 37 to the evaluation of various systems which serve 38 many users where quality of service for every in-39 dividual user defines the criteria. An example arises 40 in location theory, in which the clients of a system 41 are entitled to equitable treatment according to 42 community regulations. In such problems, the de-43 cisions often concern the placement of a service 44 center or other facility in a position so that the 93 of the results of our research is to trace the con-94 sequences of this uniformization beyond the pro-95 cess of aggregation of functions for scalarization. 96 We will show that every efficient solution of a 97 multiple criteria optimization problem can be 98 identified by the optimization of an equitable ag-99 gregation applied to appropriately defined indi-100 vidual achievements. 101 The paper is organized as follows. In the next 102 section we recall and explain in detail the concept 103 of equitable dominance and equitably efficient so-104 lutions to multiple criteria optimization problems. 
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137 i 2 I ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; mg. In order to make it opera-138 tional, one needs to assume some solution concept 139 specifying what it means to minimize multiple 140 objective functions. The solution concepts are de-141 fined by properties of the corresponding preference 142 model. We assume that solution concepts depend 143 only on evaluation of the outcome vectors while 144 not taking into account any other solution prop-145 erties not represented within the outcome vectors. 146 Thus, we can limit our considerations to the 147 preference model in the criterion space Y . 148
The preference model is completely character-149 ized by the relation of weak preference [9] , denoted 150 hereafter with ". Namely, the corresponding re-151 lations of strict preference 0 and indifference ffi are 152 defined by the following formulas: y 0 0 y 00 () ðy 0 " y 00 and not y 00 " y 0 Þ; ð2Þ y 0 ffi y 00 () ðy 0 " y 00 and y 00 " y 0 Þ:
155
The preference model related to the standard 156 Pareto-optimal solution concept also assumes that 157 the preference relation " is reflexive,
159 transitive, ðy 0 " y 00 and y 00 " y 000 Þ ) y 0 " y 000 ;
161 and strictly monotonic,
163 where e i denotes the ith unit vector in the criterion 164 space. The last assumption expresses the fact that 165 for each individual objective function less is better 166 (minimization). The preference relations satisfying 167 axioms (4)-(6) are called hereafter rational pref-168 erence relations. The rational preference relations 169 allow us to formalize the Pareto-optimal solution 170 concept with the following definitions. We say that 171 outcome vector y 0 2 Y rationally dominates y 00 2 Y 172 (y 0 0 r y 00 ), iff y 0 0 y 00 for all rational preference re-173 lations ". We say that a feasible solution x 2 Q is 174 a Pareto-optimal (or efficient) solution of the 175 multiple criteria problem (1), iff y ¼ fðxÞ is ratio-176 nally nondominated. 177
The relation of weak rational dominance " r 178 may be expressed in terms of the vector inequality: 179 y 0 " r y 00 iff y 
217
Thus a solution generating all three outcomes 218 equal to 2 is considered better than any solution 219 generating individual outcomes: 4, 2 and 0. The 220 preference relations satisfying all axioms (4)- (8) 221 we will call hereafter equitable rational preference 222 relations.
223 Requirements of impartiality (7) and the prin-224 ciple of transfers (8) do not contradict the multiple
225 criteria optimization axioms (4)- (6) . Therefore, we 226 can consider equitable multiple criteria optimiza-227 tion [6] based on the preference model defined by 228 axioms (4)- (8) . The equitable rational preference 229 relations allow us to define the concept of equita-230 bly efficient solution, similar to the standard effi-231 cient (Pareto-optimal) solution defined with the 232 rational preference relations. We say that outcome 233 vector y 0 equitably dominates y 00 (y 0 0 e y 00 ), iff 234 y 0 0 y 00 for all equitable rational preference rela-235 tions ". We say that a feasible solution x 2 Q is 236 equitably efficient (is an equitably efficient solution 237 of the multiple criteria problem (1) ð12Þ Corollary 1. A feasible solution x 2 Q is an equi-323 tably efficient solution of the multiple criteria 324 problem (1), iff it is a Pareto-optimal solution of 325 the multiple criteria problem (12) .
326
Corollary 1 provides the relationship between 327 equitable efficiency and Pareto-optimality. More-328 over, the multiple criteria problem (12) may serve 329 as a source of techniques generating equitable ef-330 ficient solutions to the original problem (1). Some 331 equitable location models have taken advantages 332 of this opportunity [5, 7, 15, 16] . Although the defi-333 nition of quantities h h k ðyÞ, used as criteria in (12) subject to x 2 Q;
363 Note that problem (14)- (16) belongs to the class of 364 convex programs provided that the feasible set Q is 365 convex and all the original criteria f i are convex 
376 In order to guarantee the consistency of the ag-377 gregated problem (17) with minimization of all 378 individual objective functions in the original mul-379 tiple criteria problem, the aggregation function 380 must be strictly increasing with respect to every 381 coordinate, i.e.
383 Every optimal solution to the aggregated problem 384 (17) is then a Pareto-optimal solution of the orig-385 inal multiple criteria problem. 386 The aggregated problem (17) and its corre-387 sponding preference model are defined by the re-388 lation: y 0 " y 00 iff gðy 0 Þ 6 gðy 00 Þ. In order to 389 guarantee equitable rationality of this preference 390 relation, the aggregation function must be strictly 391 increasing and symmetric (impartial) gðy sð1Þ ; y sð2Þ ; . . . ; y sðmÞ Þ ¼ gðy 1 ; y 2 ; . . . ; y m Þ for any permutation s of I 393 as well as equitable (to satisfy the principle of 394 transfers) gðy 1 ; . . . ; y i 0 À e; . . . ; y i 00 þ e; . . . ; y m Þ < gðy 1 ; y 2 ; . . . ; y m Þ for 0 < e < y i 0 À y i 00 : 
442 is an equitably efficient solution of the multiple 443 criteria problem (1).
444
Various convex functions s can be used to de-445 fine the aggregation (25) 
Note that the sum of outcomes (22) and the 456 worst outcome (23) also represent the L p norms for 457 p ¼ 1 and p ¼ 1, respectively. Hence, they are 458 limiting cases of the strictly Schur-convex aggre-459 gations related to 1 < p < 1. As the limiting cases 460 they satisfy the corresponding weak requirements. 461 Actually, L 1 is strictly monotonic but only weakly 462 Schur-convex while L 1 is weakly monotonic and 463 weakly Schur-convex. On the other hand, these 464 two norms can be directly extended to piecewise 465 linear aggregation functions (22) 
515
While equal weights define the linear aggrega-516 tion, several decreasing sequences of weights lead 517 to various strictly Schur-convex and strictly 518 monotonic aggregation functions. Thus, the 519 monotonic OWA aggregations provide a family of 520 piecewise linear aggregations filling out the space
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521 between the piecewise linear aggregation functions 522 (22) and (23) as shown in Fig. 2 . Actually, for-523 mulas (28) and (13) subject to x 2 Q; 537 which represents the lexicographic minimax ap-538 proach (called also the nucleolar approach [11] ) to 539 the original multiple criteria problem (1). Problem 540 (33) is a regularization of the standard minimax 541 scalarization (23), but in the former, in addition to 542 the largest outcome, we minimize also the second 543 largest outcome (provided that the largest one re-544 mains as small as possible), minimize the third 545 largest (provided that the two largest remain as 546 small as possible), and so on. Due to (9) , problem 547 (33) is equivalent to the problem lexminfHðfðxÞÞ : x 2 Qg: ð34Þ 549 As the lexicographic optimization generates effi-550 cient solutions, due to Corollary 1, the optimal 551 solution of the lexicographic minimax problem 552 (33) is an equitably efficient solution of the multi-553 ple criteria problem (1). In other words, the 554 minimax aggregation (23) can be lexicographically 555 regularized to guarantee that the corresponding 556 preference relation meets both the strict monoto-557 nicity and the principle of transfer (strict Schur-558 convexity) requirements. 559 The lexicographic minimax solution can be 560 considered in some sense the ''most equitable so-561 lution''. One may wish to look for a strictly 562 monotonic and Schur-convex regularization of the 563 minisum aggregation (22) 
574 vector y. Therefore, we refer to problem (35) as the 575 lexicographic mean problem. It follows from 576 Corollary 1 that the optimal solution of the lexi-577 cographic mean problem (35) is an equitably effi-578 cient solution of the multiple criteria problem (1).
4. Applications

580
Recently, there have appeared a number of 581 papers dealing with issues of equity and even some 582 papers which consider multiple criteria equity 583 models ( [4, 9, 10, 16, 17] and references therein). In 584 some of these papers, the solutions presented are 585 equitably efficient, but the authors do not ac-586 knowledge this fact (cf. references in [10] ), while in 587 other papers, computed Pareto-optimal solutions 588 are criticized for their lack of equity [4, 9] and the 589 authors replace the search for an equitably efficient 590 solution by minimization of some inequality 591 measures or even formally abandon the entire 592 multiple criteria model. Since the Pareto-optimal 593 set is very large in some models, it is quite possible 594 to compute efficient solutions which are very far 595 from the equitable efficient solutions. Thus, even 596 though some quite appealing equitably efficient 597 solutions may exist, they may be ignored in favor 598 of solutions which are less appealing, and less 599 justified by mathematical principles. In Section 4.1 600 we show the real-life case of the budget redistri-601 bution [4] may be effectively solved with the use of 602 equitable aggregations. 603
On the other hand, several multiple criteria 604 optimization methods build the individual 605 achievement functions which measure actual 606 achievement of each outcome with respect to the 607 corresponding preference parameters. Thus all the 608 original outcomes are transformed into a uniform 609 scale of individual achievements allowing one to 610 use some impartial aggregation techniques. This 611 applies, in particular, to the wide family of the 612 reference point method and goal programming 613 approaches. For these approaches, equity among 614 the individual achievements has been raised as an 615 important issue (cf.
[18] and references therein). In 616 Section 4.2 we will show that every efficient solu-617 tion to any multiple criteria problem can be found 618 by equitable optimization of appropriate individ-619 ual achievement functions. We especially focus on 620 the reference point methods taking advantages of 621 this relation. 622 4.1. Equitable preferences 623 Budgets, in the administration of organizations, 624 have become increasingly dynamic. Cuts in bud-625 gets get increased publicity, and equity is sought in 626 how to apply these cuts. However, budgets may 627 also reflect increases, which should also be applied 628 in a fair (equitable) manner. In this section we 629 examine the case treated by Fandel and Gal [4] , 630 and we show that it may be solved in quite a sat-631 isfying way by means of equitably efficient solu-632 tions. Fifteen state universities in North Rhine-633 Westphalia together with the German Ministry of 634 Science and Research participated in the redistri-635 bution of a part of the budget for teaching and 636 research. The authors reported on how the redis-637 tribution problem has been treated by methods of 638 Operations Research and how the final solution 639 was reached in a process of negotiations between 640 the Ministry and participating universities. The 641 decision makers agreed on a set of 5 measures of 642 university performance. The measures were cal-643 culated for each of the 15 universities, resulting in 644 constants that were combined using attribute 645 shares g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g 5 . These shares were treated as 646 decision variables in the subsequent models of the 647 decision problem. 648 The universities participating in the redistribu-649 tion requested that the resulting distribution 650 should be as close as possible to the original dis-651 tribution. Thus, the problem was modeled using 15 652 criteria jz i j, which represent the absolute deviation 653 of the new budget from the original budget of each 654 university. These criteria are obviously impartial 655 and equitable. Actually, several L p norms have 656 been applied while looking for a solution [4] . We 657 present these solutions in the first three rows of 658 Table 1 . None of the solutions have been accepted 659 by the Ministry. Finally, the optimization was 660 abandoned and after the negotiation process a 661 solution (reported in the table as ÔchosenÕ) has been 662 selected, that satisfied additional requirements of 663 the decision makers, which will be discussed be-664 low.
698
We have enforced these additional requirements 699 by restricting the attribute shares g k to the interval: 700 0:0 < g k < 0:4. It turns out that all our OWA 701 models result then in the same equitably efficient 702 solution presented as ÔoptimalÕ in Table 1 . One can 703 easily notice that the solution is much better than 704 ÔchosenÕ in terms of all the L p measures. Actually, 705 the ÔoptimalÕ solution equitably dominates the 706 ÔchosenÕ one, as clearly shown with the corre-707 sponding absolute Lorenz curves in Fig. 3 (note 708 that normalizing factor 1/15 is ignored for both the 709 axes as we start the curves from the first ordered 710 criterion thus depicting the minimax values). 711 Moreover, the solution ÔoptimalÕ meets also other 712 additional requirements and restrictions men-713 tioned in [4] . We do not want to question a solu- 
Proof. Suppose that x x 2 Q, Pareto-optimal to 789 multiple criteria problem (1) 
In the simplest models, they take a form of 854 two segment piecewise linear functions 
878 where b and c are arbitrarily defined parameters 879 satisfying 0 < b < 1 < c. Independently from the 880 specific form of the individual achievement func-881 tions, their main properties remain. Namely, for 882 any reference value b i , function s i ðy i Þ must be 883 strictly increasing with respect to y i (the ith out-884 come) and it has to take a common value (usually 885 0) for y i ¼ b i . Hence, the following assertion may 886 be derived from Theorem 3.
887 Corollary 4. For any RPM individual achievement 888 functions s i ðy i Þ, if x x 2 Q is a Pareto-optimal solution 889 to multiple criteria problem (1), then x x is also an 890 equitably efficient solution to the multiple achieve-891 ment optimization problem 
894
In other words, the RPM (individual) achieve-895 ment functions form a new uniform multiple cri-896 teria problem where the analysis can be focused on 897 equitably efficient solutions. Actually, the standard 898 RPM model with the analytic scalarizing achieve-899 ment function (38) can be expressed as the fol-900 lowing OWA model: 
